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Introduction
A well-functioning traffic and transport system is a necessity for an industri-
alised and complex society. At the same time, the way our traffic and trans-
port system is shaped and functions also causes major societal problems.
Emissions of pollutants from vehicles worsen the quality of the air, causing
health hazards to humans and other living species. Emissions of 

in par-
ticular contribute to global warming. The continuously increasing number
of vehicles makes it ever more difficult for traffic to proceed smoothly, caus-
ing congestion, limiting the accessibility of many destinations, and threaten-
ing the livability of cities and other living areas.
These problems have been on the agendas of public authorities since the
s. In general, these problems have been split into behavioural and tech-
nological problems. Emissions are regarded as a technical problem because
the engine technologies and the fuels used discharge hazardous substances.
Congestion is primarily a behavioural problem caused by people travelling
(too) much and/or choosing an inefficient means of travel.
These problem definitions strongly determine the search for solutions.
Emissions are primarily made the problem of the vehicle industry which is
requested, or forced by means of legislation, to develop cleaner engines. Con-
gestion is primarily tackled by making an appeal to people’s sense of respon-
sibility to society via awareness campaigns that request them to travel less or
to make greater use of public transport.
Over the past decade, though, policymakers as well as many others have
become increasingly skeptical about the possibilities of influencing people’s
mobility. At the same time, interest has grown in technical options to tackle
congestion problems. There appears to be a shift from the behavioural ap-
proach to the technological approach. However, this shift has not remained
uncontested.A variety of actors, especially those concerned with the environ-
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ment and the livability of cities, continue to emphasise that only a change of
behaviour on the part of travellers can lead to fundamental (or sustainable)
solutions for traffic and transport problems.
From an  perspective, this distinction between technical and behav-
ioural problems and approaches is not only strange but also counter-produc-
tive.  research has extensively shown that technical change and societal or
behavioural change typically go hand in hand. New technologies rarely just
replace existing ones. They also have new characteristics and new qualities
that influence the behaviour of users and other relevant actors. The personal
computer, for instance, was not developed as a typewriter, but once on the
market, it made the typewriter obsolete in just a few years, while at the same
time drastically transforming office work.
In this chapter, I propose a strategy aimed at improving the integration of
technical and societal/behavioural changes. To that end, I start by presenting
a framework of analysis that distinguishes different forms of socio-technical
change, depending upon the degree of behavioural change associated with it.
Subsequently, I argue that, especially in cases where a considerable degree of
behavioural change is desired (in traffic and transport, for example), a learn-
ing strategy on the potential of new socio-technical configurations in experi-
ments is crucial. I subsequently present a number of cases to illustrate some
potential findings from this kind of strategy. In the final section, I indicate
how the approach can be optimised, and I end by concluding that this kind of
approach takes the socio-technical nature of innovation much more serious-
ly than current transport policies do, and also has a larger potential to solve
transport-related problems.
Different forms of socio-technical change: optimisation versus
renewal
In the past few years, an enormous range of technical options has been devel-
oped to tackle societal problems related to traffic and transport. Some of
these can be relatively easily fitted into the existing system, while others re-
quire an extensive adaptation of the behaviour of producers as well as suppli-
ers and users of transport services. The former type of solutions receive far
more attention and are taken far more seriously than the latter.
An “easy-to-fit” option largely means that travellers do not have to change
their behaviour, the assumption being that the vast majority will never forego
using their private car. For this reason, battery-powered electric vehicles
(s) are not considered a serious option since these vehicles only have a
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very limited range on a full battery. This option would require an adaptation
of traveller behaviour (e.g., using this vehicle only for short distances and us-
ing a train or hired car for occasional long distances). In contrast, fuel cell
electric vehicles (s) do not have this range limitation and are widely
considered the “ultimate transport technology” of the future. This view is
prevalent despite the fact that, at present, s are much more expensive
than s, the technology is far more complicated and problematic, and in-
frastructure issues are also more complex. The general assumption is, howev-
er, that the technical and economic problems of s can be solved, whereas
the behavioural problems linked to s cannot.
In this chapter, I challenge this neglect of potential behavioural change by
highlighting some aspects of the socio-technical nature of innovation
processes. To characterise the current situation, I use the notion of a socio-
technical regime (or just “regime”: Kemp et al. ), in this case, the traffic
and transport regime. A regime may incorporate one or several systems in a
variable mix, such as the private car system and the public transport system in
this particular case.
Regimes are not static but inherently dynamic. Innovation takes place con-
tinuously within the regime, but it tends to be conservative with incremental
changes. The current problems of the traffic and transport regime, however,
require more radical changes to achieve sustainability. In discussing the pos-
sibility of achieving this, I distinguish two main routes, namely,“regime opti-
misation”and “regime renewal”, which can be characterised as follows (Elzen
et al. , ):
– Regime optimisation relates to innovations that can be fitted in relatively
easily. This may concern improving either the public transport system or
the car system. Changes are largely technical in nature, requiring little or
no adaptation of the traveller.
– Regime renewal relates to attempts to change regime relations more fun-
damentally through innovations with new characteristics. Examples are
new transport modalities (like door-to-door public transport concepts)
or new forms of ownership (e.g., car-sharing).A crucial distinction with
regime optimisation is that in the case of regime renewal, the behaviour of
various actors in relation to various relevant technologies changes consid-
erably; travellers need to do different things to reach their destination.
The distinction is largely a matter of degree.  research has convincingly
demonstrated that innovation is always socio-technical in nature. Still, for
the purposes of this chapter, the distinction is useful since it helps to distin-
guish the current situation from what is needed.
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Regime optimisation is current practice. This is implied in a self-fulfilling
prophecy that assumes that it is futile to try to change people’s travel habits
and their love of (using) their private car. Innovations that do not fit the cur-
rent pattern encounter a lot of skepticism and have difficulty in attracting
funds. This optimisation approach has succeeded in achieving a drastic re-
duction of vehicle-polluting emissions but has been very ineffective in tack-
ling congestion. Measures aimed at the latter (such as new infrastructure) af-
forded merely temporary relief,with problems popping up some time later or
elsewhere.
In contrast, regime renewal has a much larger potential for problem-solv-
ing,which is not surprising since, in this case, the thinking starts with the type
of behaviour that is considered desirable from the societal perspective,
whereas regime optimisation takes current travel behaviour as a starting
point.
A variety of innovations that would fit a renewal perspective have been
proposed. The problem with such innovations is that they do not fit the cur-
rent regime,either on technical grounds (e.g.,because of the lack of appropri-
ate infrastructures) or on societal/behavioural grounds (“I am not going to
share my car with others”). Small-scale introduction can occasionally be re-
alised, but innovation can only give substantial relief when applied on a large
scale. Such upscaling to realise regime renewal requires interaction between a
variety of new elements. Thus, the problem is not so much the development
of new technologies but the tuning and the societal embedding of them.
Experiments as a breeding ground for new socio-technical
configurations
Regime renewal in itself is nothing new. The current traffic and transport
regime, for instance, differs drastically from that of  years ago when cars
had a minority share of traffic. The question is whether it is possible to induce
regime renewal and guide it in a direction with far fewer societal problems. To
answer that question in full is beyond the scope of this chapter,but I shall pro-
vide a part of the answer by emphasising the need to learn via socio-technical
experiments.
Regime renewal is difficult to realise because a large set of interrelated bar-
riers impede radical change. These may include:
– technological factors
– government policy
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– cultural and psychological factors
– market factors
– production factors
– infrastructure and maintenance
– the possible undesirable societal and environmental effects of new
technologies.
Despite these barriers, history shows that radical change may still take place
because new technologies, although not (yet) ready or able to compete with
existing technologies, are initially developed and experimented with in “pro-
tected spaces”. The new technology is protected by various actors who believe
in its long-term prospects and who are willing to invest time, money, and ef-
fort in “making it work”, in both technological and social terms. Such protect-
ed spaces are called “technological niches”or just “niches”(Kemp et al. ).
These niches are experimental situations characterised by a “learning by do-
ing”approach. By trying out a variety of changes, an attempt is made to lower
or overcome the diverse obstacles.
Across the world, experiments are currently being performed utilising a
wide variety of transport innovations, in pilot or demonstration projects. All
these experiments involving a specific technology (such as electric vehicles)
collectively make up a technological niche. A major problem is that many
such projects within the niche are once-only affairs with little mutual ex-
change of information. A deliberate strategy can then be followed to learn
across these projects within a niche and, as a next step, to use this knowledge
to define further experiments attempting to integrate findings. This requires
the co-ordination of the activities of a wide range of actors. The (policy) ap-
proach targeting this co-ordination is called strategic niche management, 
(Weber et al. ; Hoogma et al. ). In the  approach, the general ob-
jective of experiments is to learn how new technologies and their societal em-
bedding can be mutually attuned.
Looking at past and ongoing experiments (usually called “pilot” or
“demonstration projects”), the vast majority of these have a strong bias for
technical (and economic) factors, and neglect the behavioural side. This,
however, side-steps the major problem since one of the most “wasteful”char-
acteristics of the current regime is the individual use of a single vehicle from
door-to-door for any kind of purpose. The challenge, therefore, is to organise
learning in experiments in such a way that it teaches something about the po-
tential for behavioural change.
To illustrate what this may render, I shall describe some experiments with
transport innovations, focussing on what they may teach with regard to op-
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tions for renewing the traffic and transport regime. These examples are not
mainstream, in the sense that they do not easily fit the current regime, and
most transport experts find them rather uninteresting. For the purpose of
this chapter’s argument, however, they are all the more interesting since their
technical drawbacks induced innovative thinking on the behavioural side.
Introduction to the cases
I shall explore this further through the analysis of three recent experiments
with electric vehicles (s). Electric vehicles fit into the current traffic and
transport regime very poorly. Energy is stored in large batteries that weigh
several hundred kilograms. Despite their large mass and volume, they give
the vehicle a range of only - km, after which the battery needs to be
recharged. In most cases, this takes - hours, although with expensive equip-
ment this can be speeded up to approximately half an hour. The large batter-
ies are expensive,costing several thousand euros for a typical vehicle,and may
have to be replaced one or more times during the vehicle’s lifetime, depend-
ing on the battery technology. This long list of negatives has made skeptics ar-
gue that s have been, are, and always will be the technology of the future. So
why bother?
Their major advantage is that they produce no polluting emissions. That is
why they are also referred to as “zero-emission vehicles”(s). Emissions do
take place at the power plant producing the electricity, but there they are less
harmful to humans than the emissions of vehicles in the cities. Even taking
power plant emissions into account, the overall emission from s can easily
be -% better than that of conventional vehicles, in part depending on the
type of power plant.
This low level of polluting emissions stimulated the US State of California
to pass legislation in  decreeing that, by , % of vehicle sales from
the major car manufacturers should be s. All through the s, the ma-
jor car manufacturers fought this requirement on the ground that s were
more expensive and performed a lot worse than conventional vehicles, and
that they could not possibly find customers for them. Implicitly, they thus ar-
gued that s did not fit the then current traffic and transport regimes.
Interestingly, though, this “technical drawback” of s led to innovative
thinking on user behaviour in connection with these vehicles.Various experi-
ments were set up in which s were used in a way different to conventional
vehicles. I briefly discuss three of these projects below, notably a -year proj-
ect with “lightweight electric vehicles” in Mendrisio, Switzerland, an experi-
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ment with a “self-service” short-term rental system near Paris, and a com-
parable but less ambitious scheme in Turin, Italy. I have studied these cases in
depth, along with many others, within the framework of an -funded inter-
national co-operative project under the name of . The results of
these analyses can be found in Zwaneveld et al. () and Ricci et al. ().
The brief descriptions below are partly based on these sources, partly on oth-
er sources indicated.
Case : Mendrisio – LEV market stimulation
Experimental set-up
In the early s, the Swiss Federal Ministry of Energy ( – Bundes En-
ergie Wirtschaft) launched a program called “Energy ” to promote
measures to stabilise the consumption of fossil fuels and 

emissions as
well as to support renewable energy sources until the year . To opera-
tionalise this program, evaluated the potential of the lightweight electric
vehicles (s) developed by various small innovators and concluded that
such vehicles were very energy-efficient and would cause far lower polluting
emissions than conventional cars.
To realise this promise, s would have to be used on a large scale. A vi-
sion was developed foreseeing a  park of , vehicles by the year
, i.e., % of the total car fleet. As a medium-term goal, the energy con-
sumption of these vehicles should be equivalent to  to . liters of gasoline per
 km, roughly five times as energy-efficient as conventional cars.
After considering various alternatives, it was decided to realise a large-scale
experiment in one community plus a number of smaller experiments in so-
called “partner communities”.One of the main objectives would be to explore
the effects of a range of promotional measures. Thus, the “Großversuch mit
Leicht-Elektromobilen”(large-scale experiment with lightweight electric ve-
hicles; in short “Großversuch”) was defined (Muntwyler ).
In December , the community of Mendrisio, in the southeastern, Ital-
ian-speaking canton of Switzerland, was chosen to host the large-scale exper-
iment. In Mendrisio, the  target of % of the national car fleet by 
would already be realised in . The experiment was to start in  and be
divided into  two-year project stages. Each project stage would be evaluated
on the basis of the adjustments to be made. This would allow for flexibility in
the project plus a safeguard that it could be stopped at an earlier point if the
results were too meager.
Over  promotional measures were identified for the experiment. Most
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noticeably, the purchase price for s would be subsidised by -%, de-
pending on vehicle performance. Lightweight vehicles are not defined by
their weight but by their energy efficiency (which is strongly correlated).
Electrically assisted bicycles and motorcycles are also subsidised by %,
while all other types of  are subsidised to a maximum of %.
The total budget for the Großversuch was  million , just over € 
million. About % of the budget was used to subsidise the purchase of vehi-
cles, while close to % was for the set-up of an infrastructure. The remainder
was reserved for project management and concomitant research. Firms
wanting to sell vehicles in the experiment had to lower their sales price by
about %. Furthermore, the canton and the community guaranteed %
(Schwegler et al. ).
The Großversuch was not only a pilot and demonstration project, but also
a research project. It was considered to be an unconventional, large-scale
practical test on a scale of : (Schwegler et al. ). An intensive research
program was conducted to analyse the effects of specific promotion meas-
ures.
Results
In mid-, four years into the project, the number of vehicles sold lagged
somewhat behind target. In the following two years, sales went up consider-
ably, and by  June  the number of s sold amounted to ,  more
than the target of  (Meier-Eisernmann et al. ).
A more important goal was to demonstrate the usefulness of s in
everyday life and to learn which support measures would help s on their
way toward market success. Most of the project participants were satisfied
with their vehicles, even though the range of the vehicles was often smaller
than promised by the dealers. The reliability of the vehicles appeared to be
good, and the vehicle costs were considered fair, which implies that the offi-
cial price of the vehicles (without federal subsidies) was still too high to intro-
duce the vehicles in an open market.
Concerning support measures, three two-year stages for introducing s
on to the market were distinguished. In the first stage, people’s interest in
s was evoked by giving them the possibility to test the new technology. In
the second stage, the financial disadvantages were reduced,and an infrastruc-
ture was realised. Finally, in the third stage, a good after-sales service was set
up, and experts such as local garage owners were further educated.
s are a good example of how new attributes from new technologies can
induce people to behave differently to what they themselves might expect.For
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instance, ex ante surveys indicated that  users across Switzerland evaluat-
ed the new option of individual mobility as an addition to their existing op-
tions. Since most household travel involves short trips, the  became the
most frequently used vehicle. For a variety of reasons (e.g., quietness, envi-
ronmental friendliness, novelty) people started to prefer the  to their con-
ventional vehicle, and they tried to avoid using the latter by planning trips
more carefully. They tended to avoid long and energy-intensive trips and al-
ways sought the shortest way to reach a certain destination. Thus, they sur-
prised even themselves, as they tried to make as many trips as possible by 
and changed their behaviour accordingly. Most  users were convinced
that the  technology was sensible and future-oriented and should be ac-
tively supported.
Evaluation
The results of the Mendrisio experiment can be evaluated in various ways.
One of the most obvious success criteria could be the number of vehicles
sold. The set target was reached, but this teaches us little about the possibili-
ties of and the barriers to the introduction of innovative transportation
schemes. More important are the lessons involving users’ mobility patterns,
the environmental aspects, and the effectiveness of political support meas-
ures. The organisers of the Mendrisio project obviously shared this view, giv-
en the extensive evaluation scheme on all of these aspects. Most of the objec-
tives were achieved in this respect.
The original goals of the experiment went beyond simply being a test proj-
ect for electric vehicles. The overarching goal was to demonstrate integrated,
sustainable forms of mobility in which s would play an essential role. The
achievement of this goal not only required a careful combination of promo-
tional measures and technological improvements of the vehicles but also
learning processes on the part of the consumers.
More important than the number of s sold were the insights gained in
processes that support the dissemination of the technology. Insights have
been gained on:
– the importance of specific promotional measures. These experiences will
prepare the ground for a nationwide introduction of s in individual
communities.
– technological questions related to the performance and environmental
characteristics of the vehicles in everyday use.
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The large-scale experiment with s in Switzerland may be seen as a para-
digmatic example of “Strategic Niche Management” (see above). Policymak-
ers take up the initiatives of individual citizens and small enterprises and try
to support the dissemination process of the technology in a non-authoritari-
an way. Actor-learning, networking, and expectation management are active
parts of the project set-up. The framework of the experiment is flexible, and
communication and monitoring receive major attention.
A major point yet to be resolved, however, which will be analysed in a fol-
low-up project, is the question of the relationship between the experiment
and the real market.Should the experiment be a testing field,a kind of labora-
tory in which components of a system are tested, or is the experiment a kind
of a simulation tool in which “critical paths” have to be identified? In the for-
mer case, the problem field consists of a number of “valves and regulators”
which have to be fine-tuned to achieve results. In the latter case, qualitatively
different routes may be taken, and the experiment has to identify these routes
and to determine the trade-offs they imply.
Although the  market share is virtually negligible in the overall Swiss
mobility spectrum, there are interesting indications that this new type of ve-
hicle may change mobility patterns. Although the  technology relies on
automobile technology and s are located “at the doorstep”(unlike, for in-
stance, car-sharing projects), users have to adapt their mobility patterns to
this new technology. They must learn how far they can drive on a battery
charge and how long it takes to recharge the batteries. Because of these limita-
tions, they have to make a conscious decision whether or not the  is suited
for a certain trip. It makes people more reflective on their travel needs and
more open towards various options to satisfy those needs. In short, their
thinking becomes less automobile-centred.
Case : Praxitèle – An advanced EV self-service system
Experimental set-up
The initiative for Praxitèle was taken by , a French public transport
company operating nationally. In ,  organised a discussion meet-
ing with passengers seeking to identify “the ideal transport concept”. Among
several alternatives, a concept based on self-service rental cars was seen as a
strong option. It was believed that this kind of system could combine the ad-
vantages of cars with the advantages of public transport. A practical set-up
should guarantee a parking place for the car user, be easy to operate, and use
non-polluting vehicles.
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After several (feasibility) studies and interaction with other French com-
panies and ministries, this idea evolved into the Praxitèle concept. Praxitèle is
a self-service  rental system. It is based on a fleet of small vehicles – the
Praxicars which are located in specific areas called the Praxiparcs. The whole
system is supervised with the help of a central computer, the Praxicentre.
The experiment, the first of its kind, started in October  in the “new
town” of Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, an outlying Paris suburb, about  km
from the centre. It has , inhabitants and two expanding industrial
zones and is considered the second most important business area in the west-
Paris region. It is linked to Paris by an extensive motorway system as well as a
fast urban train line ().
Fifty s, electric Renault Clios with a -km range, were available to the
public. In the long term, a novel vehicle specifically adapted to city use (a
small, lightweight energy-efficient ) is also being developed. The vehicles
were eventually located in  different stations at strategic places in Saint-
Quentin-en-Yvelines like railway and bus stations, shopping and business
centres, hospitals, etc. A car could be taken any time from any of the stations,
used freely as if it were a private car, and then returned to any of the stations. It
could be used by several drivers during a day, which reduced the required
parking space in the city centre. Drivers only had to have a valid driver’s li-
cense and register as a member the first time they used the system. From then
on, members could use the car as they liked, much as they would their own
private vehicle, getting in by means of a bankcard-like “Praxicard”. Each
client was automatically billed at the end of the month for the time s/he had
actually used the service.
The fleet of Praxicars was controlled by the Praxicentre, which informed
users about the nearest available vehicle via Praxi terminals or phone. It used
new telecommunications and localisation systems that were considered nec-
essary for the success of the system,since earlier experiments with self-service
cars had failed due to the lack of efficient fleet management. Each vehicle was
equipped with a GPS-based positioning system allowing the vehicle to locate
itself with a precision of about  meters. The Praxicentre also handled reser-
vations and transfers to other types of transport (train, bus, taxi).
The project partners were  Transport (’s parent company),
Renault, , Dassault Electronique (now Thomson  Detexis), and the
Municipality of Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines. Especially the participation by
Dassault is interesting, as it has no tradition in the transport business. Das-
sault primarily produced military electronics, but with the collapse of the
market for military equipment, it started to look for new markets in which to
diversify from early s onwards. Companies in this kind of position tend
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to be more open to innovative approaches in a new field where they face less
established competition.
The project budget was FF  million, just over € . million, of which %
was paid by the partners and the remaining % by the Ministry of Transport,
other French agencies, and the European Commission. The broad objective
of the Praxitèle experiment in Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines was to demon-
strate the usefulness and economic feasibility of an individual public trans-
port system based on a centrally managed fleet of small electric vehicles.
Results
The experimental phase of Praxitèle officially started on  October  and
was concluded in early . From the evaluations, it appeared that a signifi-
cant number of people had used the service. In May ,  members had
registered, a number that was to double one year later. In the one-and-a-half
years since the start of the experiment they had made , trips,covering an
average distance of  kilometers in  minutes. In April and May , the av-
erage use was about  trips a week, i.e., about one-and-a-half trips per car
per day.
Users indicated they were very satisfied with the service. A growing group
of clients became regular users as they learned how to use the system in real-
life practice. They changed their transport behaviour, especially when they
had no regular access to a private car. Users particularly appreciated the free-
dom, the ease of use of the self-service system, and the availability of cars
without worries about maintenance. They valued the fact that the cars were
electric, as an expression of their environmental concerns.
The main problems were related to the experimental and innovative fea-
tures of the service. Continuous adaptations were made during the experi-
ment to solve the technical problems that were encountered. Concerning
economic aspects, it was evident from the beginning that the scheme would
not be economically feasible. The costs of s, because they were not made as
a mass product, were far too high, while an economic break-even point was
not expected with a scheme with less than a few hundred vehicles. At the very
least, the experiment has proven that there is a substantial demand for this
kind of service. How this demand can be satisfied in a cost-effective way is as
yet unclear, as detailed economic evaluations have not yet been made.
Initially, it was feared that the system would compete directly with taxis,
and there was even a threat of resistance from taxi driver unions. In practice,
taxis have not experienced a loss of clientele. The self-service system was a
complement to existing public transport systems that may have taken away
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some customers from taxis but may also have increased their client base by
creating demand for a taxi in cases where there were no self-service vehicles
available at a specific station when needed.
The managers of the project were satisfied that the technical feasibility of
the system had been proven and that more detailed results should help define
the conditions for successful implementation of the service. Larger-scale
projects are being considered for other sites, and a project has been proposed
for Paris with some , cars. In the longer term, an operator should be able
to offer cities and public transport authorities a service based on this type of
self-service system. The Praxitèle experiment suggests that there is a place for
a self-service car system in urban transport.
Evaluation
Within the framework of an -funded project on strategic niche manage-
ment, interviews were held with a variety of people who worked on the Prax-
itèle project (public bodies and partners in the experiment). In these inter-
views, two main issues emerged: the funding and the technical complexity of
the experiment (Simon ).
One crucial aspect of the Praxitèle project is the large number of techno-
logical innovations incorporated in the system, including:
– the non-contact smart card that offers easy access to the cars and facilitates
fare collection;
– the automatic connection with the inductive charger;
– electric vehicles;
– real-time communication between the vehicles and the management cen-
tre; on-board electronics to control the vehicle, assist the driver, and calcu-
late the trip cost;
– mathematical models to optimise the redistribution of cars among Praxi-
cars, and the recharging process of electric vehicles; and
– multimedia terminals installed in the Praxiparcs to assist the users, e.g., to
call a vehicle when required.
Many of these innovations were not standard technology for most users of
the Praxitèle system or its operators. It was quite risky to include so many in-
novative technologies in a transport system that was itself a radical innova-
tion as a transport concept. The increased risk of technical failure could have
had a negative impact on the perception of users who could confuse the use-
fulness of the concept with the way it functioned. This also raised more prob-
lems in assessing user satisfaction and the functioning of the system.
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To avoid these risks, a less ambitious set-up could have been chosen, by
drawing upon certain car-sharing systems that incorporated very simple
technologies and operated quite well, for instance. However, this might have
invoked other problems. For example, if conventional cars had been chosen
rather than s, there might have been a problem in finding a suitable loca-
tion as most municipalities were primarily interested in transport projects
with “clean”vehicles.
The initiators of the project were well aware that it was risky because it in-
volved a wide variety of new elements: a new transport concept, various new
technologies, an unusual combination of network partners. Several partners
were among the largest firms in France, yet they were not willing to invest
large sums because of these risks.As a consequence, the Praxitèle consortium
looked intensively for public support. Also in this strategy, the project risk
proved to be a major hurdle that delayed the experiment for almost two years.
The industrial partners wanted public authorities to commit themselves to
the project because the project would be so innovative (and, consequently,
risky) while public authorities were also reluctant to give major support for
the same reason.
Eventually, the project was funded in spite of much opposition. There were
technical problems, but the service did work well enough to allow an explo-
ration of the concept in a practical situation. It appeared that a substantial
number of users valued it as a useful and environmentally friendly comple-
ment to public transport.These drivers form a very small minority in relation
to the total number of car users, but the results legitimise designing a larger-
scale follow-on project to explore how this kind of concept can be trans-
formed into a service useful to many.
Case : Elettra Park – the Turin automatic electric car rental
Experimental set-up
The quality of the air in the city of Turin in the early s was considered to
be rather poor. A substantial part of this was attributed to extensive car use.
Noise was also considered an important nuisance. The Turin city authorities
felt they had a responsibility to reduce 

emissions and the associated
greenhouse effect. To tackle these problems, the city supported a project with
a number of s that were made available at rental stations on the periphery
of the city where people had arrived by other means. They could rent the 
for a limited period to serve their needs in the city, bring it back to the station,
after which it would be available again for use by others. To make this type of
scheme functional, it had to be transparent and easy to use.
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The experiment, named Elettra Park, was started in  as a joint venture
between the Turin City Council,  (Public Transport Company), 
(Electricity Company) and Fiat. Elettra Park consisted of  electric Fiat Pan-
das that could be rented automatically from a public parking area. The park-
ing lot was on the edge of the city centre, was easily accessible by public trans-
port, and had separate sections for s and conventional vehicles. The s
could be used only within the urban area, from . a.m. to . p.m. every
day of the week. The cars had room for two passengers as the battery took up
the entire rear seat room. The battery allowed an urban range of about -
km and then took  hours to recharge.
Customers first had to sign a contract at the permanently staffed office and
pay a deposit. The customer then received a chipcard that stored a prepaid
budget. At the parking lot, the customer could use her/his card to open the
door of an  and subsequently use it. After use, the vehicle had to be re-
turned and parked in any of the spaces designated for s. The minimum
rental fee was  lira (approx.€ .) for up to one hour of use. After this pe-
riod, an additional fee was charged per minute at a rate of  lira for the sec-
ond hour and  lira for each additional hour. The fee included rent, elec-
tricity, third-party liability and motor hull insurance, and parking fees for the
 in the city as well as for the customer’s own vehicle in the designated area
in Elettra Park while s/he was using the Panda Elettra.
The project consisted of two stages: the first stage, from  September 
until the end of , was to test the“basic features”of the system,and a second
stage that went until the end of  with a new cost and regulation structure.
Turin City Council announced the availability of the cars through a variety of
means, such as advertising on billboards, in public offices, at the university,
etc.
The total budget was  billion Italian lira (about €  million). The funds
came from the City Council, an institutional environmental project, and Fiat.
The main learning goal of the project was to test the users’ acceptance of a
new individual and public transport system. Data on the system’s perform-
ance were continuously collected by monitoring the technical operation as
well as customer behaviour and feedback. The latter info was collected
through surveys and telephone interviews, and all data were processed by a
local transport research centre, .
Results
During the project, information was collected on numbers of customers, pat-
terns of use, behavioural aspects, and opinions on the initiative. In the first
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stage of the experiment, until  January , almost  cards had been sold
to users. Peak sales occurred in the first few weeks, with  cards sold in the
first month, dropping to an average of around  new customers a week after
one year. In total, during the first stage, close to , trips were made cover-
ing over , km.This corresponded to an average of  trips a day.On av-
erage, each vehicle was rented for about three hours a day, in which it was
driven for about . hours. This rate of use was about % higher than that of
the average privately owned conventional vehicle in Turin.
To learn about possible changes in overall mobility patterns, an analysis
was made of where the users came from and of the transport means used to
arrive at Elettra Park. The majority of users lived nearby and walked to the
parking area. About one quarter of them used public transport, while a small
minority exchanged their own conventional vehicle for an  at the transfer
point. The vehicles were mostly used for shopping and running errands,
while a minority of the trips were for work purposes. The users indicated the
Elettra Park scheme had two attractive features, namely, that parking was free
and that the , because of its zero-polluting emissions, was allowed to drive
in areas closed to most other traffic.
Overall user satisfaction was decidedly positive.Over % of the users stat-
ed that the system was good, while % judged it as excellent, and none of
those interviewed gave an overall negative judgement.The operations involv-
ing the borrowing and returning of a vehicle, which appeared to be compli-
cated in the design phases, were judged to be easy; there were no problems
with the management of the card, and the fees were considered fair.
The most serious points of criticism were the opening hours and waiting
times. Over one-quarter of the customers felt that the system should be open
longer during of the day. Furthermore, right at the outset, it appeared that the
demand was higher than the availability of vehicles. Because of this, some
people abandoned the system, but most liked it enough to wait for an  to
return. Also, the more frequent users got used to the system as time went by,
and learned when the chances of obtaining a car were the highest.
Evaluation
As an experiment, Elettra Park has been in operation for several years, and as
a transport service, it has become a part of the living habits of a good number
of Turin residents. It is an interesting case because it looks at the technical as
well as the behavioural aspects of mobility. It has rendered knowledge on the
potential of a public transport service using personal vehicles and, in some
cases, on how to combine this service with the use of a privately owned con-
ventional vehicle.
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The experiment has yielded several important insights, such as:
– it has demonstrated the feasibility of a system of instant rental of vehicles
operating under conditions of complete autonomy;
– it has demonstrated a significant interest in a transport system with mini-
mum environmental impact and has created, in particular, renewed inter-
est in electric vehicles;
– it has been accepted by a large (perhaps too numerous) group of users
who had no difficulty in subscribing to and using the service;
– it has shown that many urban trips, for various reasons, can be made with
vehicles with limited autonomy;
– it has found its specific market niches of optimum use within the context
of the need for mobility in city centres.
The project also demonstrated the need to improve specific features of the
scheme, such as the correct size of the car fleet to guarantee an efficient serv-
ice. A more technical facet, already anticipated, was the need to reduce the
recharge requirement in order to increase a vehicle’s daily autonomy. To-
wards the end of the project, on the basis of the initial findings, the Turin City
Council developed plans to create four other transfer points in the city for an
interchange between conventional and electric cars.
The overall experience was quite satisfactory, and there were only minor
technical problems. The technical aspects of the electric Panda and its
recharging infrastructure were judged quite positively. In general, user satis-
faction was also very positive. They confirmed that electric cars provided a
comfortable mode of transport and that the set of privileges granted to stim-
ulate their use (free parking, the possibility of driving inside limited access
zones) made it interesting and attractive.
Relevance of empirical findings for sustainable mobility
In the common view, battery-powered electric vehicles will not play a very se-
rious role in the greater traffic and transport regime. At best, they are consid-
ered an intermediary step towards further innovations like hybrid electric ve-
hicles (that combine an internal combustion engine with an electric drive) or
fuel cell electric vehicles. This bias in thinking, however, is caused by seeing
s as a mere substitute for conventional vehicles. Interestingly, these “tech-
nical drawbacks” have led various actors not to think in terms of improving
s but in terms of changing the behaviour of travellers. Thus, technical
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change is used as a lever to evoke behavioural change.
The Praxitèle and Elettra Park projects clearly feature a vision of a new
transport concept. They can be considered as specific examples of novel indi-
vidualised public transport systems. s are not just seen as a vehicle to re-
place the existing car but as a new transport mode to be used in conjunction
with other modes.Although less explicitly, this is also reflected in the Mendri-
sio experiment, e.g., by offering a railway pass to  owners.
In all of these projects, users were fairly positive about the vehicles and the
set-up. The users of the Elettra Park confirmed that electric cars provided a
comfortable mode of transport and that the set of privileges granted to stim-
ulate their use (free parking; possibility to move into limited access zones)
was interesting and made it attractive to use a modal chain. The technical as-
pects of the electrical Panda and its recharging infrastructure were also
judged quite positively. Praxitèle has also stimulated a change in traveller be-
haviour towards intermodality. At the very least the experiment has proven
there is a substantial demand for such a service.
What do these findings imply for sustainable mobility? It should be ac-
knowledged that it is too soon to make firm claims about the wider potential
of such schemes. Still, it can be illuminating to speculate a little on the possi-
bilities of these concepts stimulating a transformation of regime.Experiences
with pioneer users and the users within the Mendrisio experiment suggest a
role for s in a future,more environmentally benign mobility system.Most
 users initially bought their  as a second car. Subsequently, however,
the first car declined in importance, and the attitude towards individual mo-
bility became increasingly open-minded and less “automobile centred”. As
s are able to cover short distances and are best suited for regular trips,
which are easy to plan, they would be an ideal complement to car-sharing (to
satisfy the occasional need for a long-distance ride) or public transport.
Elettra Park and, especially, Praxitèle have demonstrated that these
schemes provide a useful link in an intermodal mobility chain for various
users. In various national and  policy plans, functional intermodal chains
are seen as a major promise to reduce the dominance of the private car. This
would be a very environmentally friendly and energy-efficient scheme, espe-
cially if these schemes included s. This would thus provide an important
step towards sustainability on several dimensions.
Thus, in contrast to the common view presented at the start of this section,
these experiments have rendered positive results on the potential of s as
part of a sustainable mobility regime. They do so because they have not taken
current travel behaviour as a starting point but have exploited the “technical
drawbacks”of s to induce a change of behaviour.
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Inducing and guiding socio-technical change
The previous section raises the question of the wider relevance of these re-
sults for inducing change towards sustainable mobility. Thus, the first issue is
to optimise learning in experiments so that it renders useful information on
the potential of a combined technical and social/behavioural change. The
second issue is to use this knowledge to stimulate the wider uptake of new op-
tions, which implies a change in the roles of various actors.
Learning in experiments
A wide variety of alternative transport options have been tested in many
countries around the world. They include new propulsion technologies
(electric, hybrid, natural gas, bio-fuels), new vehicle types (electric and pow-
er-assisted bicycles, city-cars), new transport concepts (people movers, on-
demand services, personal public transport), new ownership configurations
(car-sharing). The findings of these projects were usually ambiguous, often
indicating some promising features as well as barriers to practical use. This
variety of options is called the “portfolio of promises” (Elzen et al. , -
). A promise in this case means that an option has certain characteristics
that, when fully exploited, would offer a far more sustainable solution to
(some of) our traffic and transport problems than current “mainstream de-
velopments”. Each of these options, however, also has problems that prevent
it from being used on a large scale.
In such a situation, it is not wise to cut the knot now and focus only on a
few of them. It is important to first explore the potential of a variety of op-
tions further and to combine the findings of different experiments in order to
be able to assess the potential under different circumstances. Because the re-
sults of past projects were ambiguous, it is important to design proper proj-
ects to learn more about the potential and feasibility of various options, the
world in which they have to function, and the measures that need to be taken
to mutually adjust the technologies and the social environment in which they
have to be produced and used.
Looking at the learning processes of past and currently ongoing experi-
ments, the subject of learning is usually far too narrow. Most experiments are
either seen as the final step towards implementation, even when there are
many unknown issues, or they are a once-only affair without a clear vision on
how to use the results for the next steps. Because of the focus on direct imple-
mentation, most projects also have a strong emphasis on the economic as-
pects. However, this makes little sense with regard to more radical innova-
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tions since transport concepts, user behaviour, and vehicle characteristics
will only become clear in a longer iterative process of socio-technical change.
The optimal vehicle in a Praxitèle-like scheme, for instance, is not the heavy
type of  used in the experiment but, more likely, a very small, relatively
lightweight vehicle with a rather limited range that could be much cheaper
than current vehicles on the market. Assessing economic aspects on the basis
of the current experiment is therefore highly unrealistic.
In terms of the subject of this chapter, current experiments have a bias to-
wards technical (and economic) factors, not acknowledging that innovation
is a co-production process in which the social and the technical facets are both
subject to change. However, this is a missed opportunity since, in some cases,
the behavioural side may provide the largest potential to achieve societal
goals.
Another major flaw in current practice is that experiences from different
projects are not combined. Individual projects hardly ever build further
upon the experiences gained elsewhere, and results are not made widely
available. Evaluation reports from different projects use widely varying eval-
uation methodologies attuned to local interests, making it very difficult to
draw generalised conclusions by comparison. This creates a barrier for a
process of collective and accumulative learning.
This would be much improved if at least some of these evaluations were to
follow some standard guidelines. These could easily be enforced by the  or
national agencies that usually sponsor such projects. From their position of
power or authority, these organisations could set minimum requirements for
the evaluation process. As stated above, these evaluation guidelines should
address technical as well as social/behavioural issues in order to exploit the
socio-technical co-construction potential to the full.
From niche explorations to regime change
It is one thing to develop and explore new socio-technical configurations in a
niche, but quite another to implement them on a scale sufficiently large to
change the existing regime. The vast majority of transportation experts and
policy makers argue that such “niche experiences” are largely irrelevant since
it is futile to challenge the dominance of the car.They argue that there is no al-
ternative that has all the attractions and functionalities of a car.
However, transformation processes in the past have indicated that innova-
tions hardly ever attract large groups of users immediately. Especially the
more radical innovations are initially only used by a relatively small group of
“early adopters”(Rogers ). In some cases they may gradually attract larger
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groups, either because of new features that new groups of users find attractive
or because of increasing problems in the existing regime (or a combination of
both). Especially in the case of radical innovations that do not fit readily into
existing user patterns, we see a co-production process par excellence, i.e.,
there is a continuous change on the technical as well as the behavioural side:
new user constituencies have new requirements, leading to some technical
change that may then attract further user groups, etc.
In this respect, a first hurdle in the above-described experiments has al-
ready been taken,which is to demonstrate that a group of“early adopters”can
be found, illustrating that there is more room for change in traveller behav-
iour than is commonly assumed. An interesting next step would be to take a
closer look at these first users and to investigate what stimulated them to
change their behaviour and, from this, to infer the obstacles and the opportu-
nities with regard to attracting wider groups of users. On the basis of this type
of analysis, various hypotheses might be developed, to be tested in further ex-
periments. After further learning has indicated that a “working” socio-tech-
nical configuration can be developed, an attempt can be made to scale up by
means of regular market processes or via government stimulation or regula-
tion.
This, of course, is easier said than done. We face a whole new set of prob-
lems, since what we need to deal with is not just the sale of a new technology
but the development of a new socio-technical configuration on a large scale,
which requires a whole set of changes, such as new vehicles, new services, new
infrastructures, new user patterns, new regulations, etc.
A starting point on how to achieve this could be to look at the policy in-
struments that have been used in the past to tackle traffic and transport prob-
lems, including:
– regulation (e.g., safety and traffic rules, emission standards);
– financial instruments (taxes and subsidies);
– infrastructure provision.
These instruments have been used with some success, especially to curb pol-
luting emission, but they have proved rather ineffective in stimulating behav-
ioural change. In the s, it was increasingly acknowledged that the latter
would require, among others, more open and participatory policy making
processes. But the way in which this could actually be implemented, and the
way a balance could be struck between public participation and political
“knot-cutting” remains an open question and subject to a lot of ongoing de-
bate and research. To even capture the highlights of that debate would be
beyond the scope of this chapter.
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Nonetheless, the point can be made that whatever the nature of the process
to stimulate wider use of specific options, the quality of the outcome increas-
es when more options are available and have demonstrated their strong and
weak points in experimental settings. This is especially true of options that
demonstrate the possibility of behavioural change, since this kind of change
is seen both as a necessity and an impossibility in the present situation.
Changing actor roles
This impossibility is partly based on the observation that different types of
actors are strongly committed to the current regime, making it unattractive,
difficult or unprofitable for them to change. A closer look, however, reveals
that these networks are not homogeneous. Some actors start changing their
visions and roles in a way that could give new options a better chance. Let me
give a few examples.
The larger car manufacturers, in particular, have become aware that the
popularity of the car might mean that it is digging its own grave, particularly
in urban areas. At least some of them have shown an explicit interest in
longer-term visions that attempt to combine the use of personal vehicles with
mass transit systems. The participation of Fiat and Peugeot in the two experi-
ments described is a clear indication of this. In both cases, their emphasis is
more on the conceptual aspects of the set-up than on the sale of the vehicles
used. These industries seem to be well aware that the technical characteristics
of an  call for changes in behaviour that, in turn, will affect the design of an
 to match that new form of behaviour to an optimum degree. They realise
that a mass-produced  has yet to be defined and that such experiments
could help them to do so. This is a rather uncommon type of openness to-
wards learning on the part of the car industry, which, however, could be an
important asset in the long term.
Additional support may come from industries that are facing problems in
their traditional markets and are therefore looking for diversification. The
participation of Dassault in the Praxitèle experiment is a clear case in point.
s thus stimulate new thinking about transportation, which also stimulates
new actors to become part of transportation networks.
Another important actor in the traffic and transport regime is the trans-
port providers. They face enormous challenges as, on the one hand, they are
urged to increase the quality of their services to compete better with the pri-
vate car while, on the other hand, the tendency towards liberalisation over
the past decade has forced them to work more cost-effectively, which puts a
strain on quality.This strain makes some of them more open towards innova-
 Boelie Elzen
Inside the Politics of Technolo  24-06-2005  10:58  Pagina 192
tive concepts that are not just a repeat of the same old notions. This is clearly
the case with the transport operators involved in Elettra Park and Praxitèle.
Their participation is important in order to increase the chances that the
schemes will be used in practice if experimental results actually justify this.
There is a lack of transport operators in the Mendrisio experiment, making it
unlikely that s will ever be used in or in combination with public transport
schemes. It is striking, for instance, that the rail passes offered with the s in
Mendrisio are hardly used.
Users have traditionally played a rather passive role in transport innova-
tion. Innovations were shaped by industry and marketed partially in accor-
dance with relevant government regulations. All that users could do was ei-
ther accept or reject an innovation that was shaped elsewhere. In the three ex-
periments discussed, however, users played a much more active role, and
their views on the changes necessary to improve functionality and attractive-
ness were taken into account. In the Praxitèle case, user opinions even helped
to identify this as a promising concept that was subsequently developed into
an experiment. In Switzerland, pioneer users defined the concept of a light-
weight .Obviously, the active involvement of users can help to define inno-
vations that come close to their own needs. This innovative power of users,
which is more radical than that coming from technology developers in many
cases, can be an important asset to tackle the problems of traffic and trans-
port.
The role of various government bodies is also changing. Many local gov-
ernments in particular are fed up with the problems of massive car use. They
are more open towards experimenting with radical solutions, contrary to the
skeptical opinions of experts, and they are increasingly taking more drastic
measures, such as closing off parts of the city for cars and only admitting
“clean” vehicles. National and  authorities are also rethinking their roles.
They are displaying greater openness towards unconventional new options,
although when new policies are eventually implemented, they do tend to
confirm the existing situation of car dominance.One of the major reasons for
this is that they believe that there are no serious alternatives “for the masses”.
As was argued in the preceding section, this is partly due to the fact that les-
sons from a wide variety of experiments with alternatives are not combined
to generate a cumulative learning process. It was also indicated how govern-
ments or their agencies themselves could fill this gap by formulating specific
evaluation requirements for experiments with transport innovations. Most
importantly, such evaluations should address technical as well as behavioural
aspects, to acknowledge and exploit the socio-technical nature of innovation.
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Conclusion
To tackle the societal problems of mobility, most policymakers at various lev-
els (local, national, and European) agree that it would be desirable to reduce
the role of the car.Across Europe,many attempts have been made to stimulate
this over the past decades. However, with a few exceptions, the results have
been very meagre. One result of this is that policymakers as well as other ac-
tors in the field have become increasingly skeptical about the possibilities of
changing people’s travel habits. In the Netherlands, for instance, an advisory
council on mobility recommended, in late , that attempts to make life
difficult for car users should be stopped ( Council ).
Indeed, looking at traffic and transport at the regime level, the position of
the car seems unchallenged. The number of cars as well as the amount of ve-
hicle-kilometers travelled have risen continuously throughout the th cen-
tury. It is a paradigmatic example of how regimes tend to perpetuate them-
selves by incremental change, leaving some basic features uncontested.
The impossibility of changing people’s travel behaviour is further sup-
ported by stated preference surveys, the most widely used instrument to scan
people’s transportation needs and to assess the potential of possible innova-
tions. Such surveys, however, give a poor indication of the potential for
change, as people tend to think in terms of their current needs and behaviour
and the technologies they are familiar with.
What current approaches actually do is neglect the societal/behavioural
side of innovation processes. By taking people’s unwillingness to change their
travel behaviour as a starting point, they subsequently turn this into a self-
fulfilling prophecy by stimulating those alternatives that require little or no
change of behaviour. Options that do require a change of behaviour are dis-
missed because they are considered unrealistic. This assumption is not only
questionable, it also bypasses the greatest potential to tackle transportation
problems.
The assumption is debatable because “hands-on” experience in experi-
ments (in contrast to survey questionnaires) indicates that users are willing
to change their behaviour even contrary to their own expectations. On the
basis of the three cases described in this chapter,we illustrated that s,which
are usually discarded because they are “technically inferior”, can also be a
source of innovation on the behavioural side.
With this experience, and given the magnitude of the problems encoun-
tered and the likelihood that they will worsen in view of the expected mobility
growth, it is neither justified nor wise to take car dominance as an unques-
tioned starting point. Unsuccessful attempts to change people’s travel habits
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in the past should not be taken as an example of the impossibility to achieve
this but, rather, as an opportunity to learn something about how regimes may
or may not change. Past attempts sought to tackle the car-dominated traffic
and transport regime head-on, attempting to stimulate the “common user”
to change his or her travel habits. It is acknowledged that people in smaller
niches behave differently, but these are not seen as representative of the com-
mon user.Therefore, these niches are taken to be of little relevance to the issue
of tackling the problems of traffic and transport. As a result of this attitude,
there have been numerous experiments with traffic and transport innova-
tions which have been accepted as failures, and the reports on which have
vanished deep down into a drawer never to reappear.
However, the scrap heap of failed experiments is probably also a goldmine
of relevant lessons, especially if we pay attention to the socio-technical nature
of innovation. That these experiences are only based on small experiments
should not be an argument in favour of the idea that they are invalid for larger
groups. In the history of socio-technical change, there are many examples of
regime transformations where the initial users were not representative of the
later “common” user. The history of the personal computer is a clear case in
point. The challenge is to try and understand, partly via learning in follow-up
socio-technical experiments, how further developments can make the inno-
vation attractive to larger groups of users.
Taking behavioural change serious in an experimental setting may smooth
the path via which an alternative option can be used on a larger scale. This
broadens the range of options to solve problems, compared to the myopic fo-
cus on technical aspects that is largely current practice.For instance, it is often
argued that battery capacity is a large barrier to the widespread use of s.
This depends, however, on what type of  is used for what type of purpose.
For instance, in a follow-up to the Praxitèle experiment, it might appear that
the ideal vehicle is a small, lightweight two-seater  that has a typical range
of  km a day. Because it is lightweight, it is very energy efficient, and because
it is typically operated at moderate speeds, the range might be realised with a
-kg battery with a minor back-up facility to recharge (partly) some of the
vehicles during daytime. This contrasts with the expensive -kg battery
that is common in current s, thus largely dispelling the battery problem.
The big issue, of course, is how such learning can be used to make the traf-
fic and transport regime (more) sustainable. On this issue, we need to be
modest, partly since past experiments and the way they have been evaluated
have only hinted at the potential for a regime transformation rather than
demonstrating it. On the basis of the cases presented in this chapter, we can-
not conclude that these  systems in their current form should be a central
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element of a sustainable traffic and transport system. The knowledge base to
decide this upon is still far too small.
Another reason to be modest is that  research, in particular, has
demonstrated that socio-technical change is a very complicated process in
which large numbers of actors and factors play a role. This makes it very diffi-
cult or even impossible to guide or steer these processes towards achieving so-
cietal goals. Maybe the best we could strive for is to “modulate” the ongoing
dynamics (Rip and Schot ). Still, however difficult this may be, new so-
cio-technical configurations that have been demonstrated in a niche have a
better chance of “breaking through” than options that have been dismissed a
priori. For that reason, the approach of Strategic Niche Management is im-
portant to broaden the range of new socio-technical configurations that
work, i.e., work technically as well as socially.
In that sense, the cases do allow an important conclusion, namely, that
users are willing to, and certainly do, change their behaviour when they are
confronted with specific new transport options in experiments. Stated pref-
erence surveys, in most cases the most important instrument to assess user
requirements, are a poor indicator of this and can never match learning from
experience. The challenge, therefore, is to design a sufficient range of experi-
ments to be able to draw more general conclusions on what is possible under
which conditions.
This then broadens the range of options that have been proven in practice
and may point to a variety of promising options that are too easily dismissed
in current transport policy. The way in which one can actually stimulate the
implementation of the most sustainable options is a follow-up issue that is
beyond the scope of this chapter, but by broadening the range of alternatives,
the “socio-technical” strategy sketched above can definitely make an impor-
tant contribution en route to a sustainable traffic and transport regime.
Innovation is a co-production process in which technical as well as so-
cial/behavioural aspects change. Mainstream approaches to tackling the cur-
rent problems of transport, however, neglect this socio-technical nature. Be-
havioural change is considered unrealistic, and current transportation poli-
cies focus on technical solutions. Although, like any other innovation, this
will also evoke some societal/behavioural changes, a lot of the potential falls
by the wayside in a largely self-fulfilling approach.
This becomes most clearly visible in the small-scale experiments such as
the ones described above.They point to potential new socio-technical config-
urations that could be important in a sustainable mobility regime. Taking
these lessons seriously and, moreover, designing and evaluating experiments
in such a way that behavioural change may be induced may reveal more solid
stepping stones for a route towards sustainable mobility.
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Notes
 The concept of a “technological niche”should not be confused with a “market
niche”. The latter refers to a subsection of a larger economic market with specific
characteristics, like the market for advanced sports cars. These characteristics are
taken more or less to fix the size of that market. In contrast, a technological niche
initially needs “outside protection”to survive.After a period of development and
learning, however, the protection needs to be removed, after which market expan-
sion becomes one of the main targets. Thus, a technological niche represents a
specific phase in an innovation process, preceding market development, whereas
a market niche represents a specific type of market. Cf. Elzen et al. ().
 Not all vehicles need to be s. Hybrid cars (that combine an internal combus-
tion engine with an electric drive) that can drive a certain distance on their bat-
tery may be counted as “partial s”.
  – Urban Transport: Options for Propulsion Systems and Instruments for
Analysis. Further info can be found on the Internet: http://www.utopia-eu.com/
 Largely based on Harms and Truffer (), and Schwegler and Trento ().
Additional information can be found on the Internet: http://www.infovel.ch/
 Largely based on Simon (), Bleijs et al. (), and Carli ().
 Largely based on Carrara and Inaudi (, ) and Zwaneveld et al. ().
 Various other experiments also indicate that at least certain groups of users are
open to new travel options, such as the Autoplus/Liselec experiment and the Touc
in France, and the  minibus in the .
 This is evident from a variety of projects the author has recently been engaged in,
such as  (cf. Elzen et al. ),  (cf. www.utopia-eu.com), 
project (cf.Weber et al. ; Hoogma et al. ).
 The author is currently engaged in research to develop this kind of evaluation re-
quirements for various types of options from the “portfolio of promises”.
 The most widely used concept in this respect is “governance”(for an overview, see
Kersbergen and Van Waarden ). The author and his colleagues have con-
tributed, using the concept of “Interactive Technology Policy”(Elzen et al. ).
 Experience with the Touc in Toulouse underscores this point. Here, an  is used
to transport people between their homes and a supermarket, in a service provided
by the Casino supermarket chain. The organisers prioritised the service they
wanted to provide to specific customers, and subsequently chose the simplest 
technology to satisfy this need. The technical solution chosen was unconvention-
al, a modified golfcart, but it did what it had to do in order to serve the needs of
customers. It is considered such a success that it will be used in various other
French cities in the near future as well (Guellard ).
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